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JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction for this appeal is conferred upon this Court by 
Utah Code Annotated § 78-2a-3(k). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. Were the trial court's Findings of Fact, specifically 
those challenged by plaintiff, adequately supported by the 
evidence. A trial court's factual findings are given considerable 
deference because of the trial court's ability to assess the 
witnesses credibility and will not be disturbed on appeal unless 
they are clearly erroneous. Findings of fact are clearly erroneous 
if they are against the clear weight of the evidence, or if the 
appellate court reaches a definite and firm conviction that a 
mistake has been made. Western Capital & Securities v. Knudsvig. 
768 P.2d 989, 991 (Utah App. 1989). 
To mount a successful attack on the trial court's findings of 
fact, it is an appellant's burden to marshall all of the evidence 
in support of the trial court's findings and then demonstrate that 
despite this evidence, the trial court's findings are so lacking in 
support as to be against the clear weight of the evidence. When an 
appellant fails to meet this burden, the trial court's findings are 
accepted as valid. Saunders v. Sharp, 793 P.2d 927, 931 (Utah App. 
1990). 
2. Did the trial court err in its interpretation of U. C. A. 
§ 78-14-4. A trial court's conclusions of law are examined by the 
appellate court for correctness and are accorded no particular 
deference. Smith v. Smith, 793 P.2d 407, 409 (Utah App. 1990). 
3. Did the trial court err in finding as a matter of law 
that the continuing treatment doctrine was not applicable to this 
case and was not applicable in Utah since the passage of U.C.A. 
§ 78-14-4. A trial court's conclusions of law are examined by the 
appellate court for correctness and are accorded no particular 
deference. Smith v. Smith, 793 P.2d 407, 409 (Utah App. 1990). 
DETERMINATIVE LAW 
Utah Code Annotated § 78-14-4 of the Utah Healthcare 
Malpractice Act. (Attached as Addendum "A"). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is a medical malpractice action arising from the 
performance of the second of three stages of ileoanal anastomosis 
surgery on plaintiff G. Kevin Jones by James M. Becker, M.D. ("Dr. 
Becker") on February 27, 1984. (R. at 2-10). At the time of the 
procedure, and at all other relevant times, Dr. Becker was a full 
time employee and faculty member in the Department of Surgery at 
the University of Utah Medical Center. (R. at 463-464) . All 
surgeries and treatment performed and rendered by defendants were 
provided at the University of Utah Medical Center. 
Plaintiff's Notice of Intent to Commence Action was served on 
December 4, 1987. (R. at 3). A request for prelitigation review 
was filed by plaintiff on January 15, 1988. (R. at 3). This 
action was commenced April 26, 1988. (R. at 2-10). After 
significant discovery, this matter was tried to the trial court, 
without a jury, on November 12, 13 and 25, 1991. In accordance 
with § 78-12-47, UCA (1953 as amended) the trial was bifurcated and 
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limited to the issues pertaining to defendants' statute of 
limitations defense. (R. at 976). 
The trial Court's Decision following the statute of 
limitations trial was rendered on December 18, 1991. (R. at 1046-
1054; Attached as Addendum "B"). Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law were entered by the trial court on January 23, 1992. (R. at 
1083-1089; Attached as Addendum "C"). After hearing the arguments 
and evidence presented by both parties, and reviewing the trial 
briefs submitted by the parties, the trial court dismissed 
plaintiff's action due to the fact that it was not commenced within 
the time required by § 78-14-4. (R. at 1083-1089). The trial 
court found that plaintiff's action was time barred because it was 
not commenced within two years after he knew and reasonably should 
have known of his alleged injuries and that he might have a cause 
of action against defendants. (R. at 1083-1089). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. In 1977 plaintiff graduated from law school and commenced 
employment as a lawyer with the federal government in Alaska. (R. 
at 848). 
2. During 1980, while in Alaska, plaintiff began 
experiencing gastrointestinal problems. He consulted a physician 
in Alaska and was treated with Azulfadine. (R. at 848). 
3. In November 1980 plaintiff moved to Utah. In Utah his 
gastrointestinal problems persisted and he consulted Dr. J. P. 
Hughes, a gastrointestinal surgeon, Dr. Lynn L. Wilcox, a 
gastroenterologist, and subsequently Dr. Clifford G. Harman, a 
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gastroenterologist. Dr. Harman has treated plaintiff from 1981 to 
the present. (R. at 848). 
4. In 1981 Dr. Hughes, Dr. Wilcox and Dr. Harman diagnosed 
plaintiff's condition as chronic ulcerative colitis. Dr. Harman 
treated plaintiff medically with a drug called Azulfadine and 
Prednisone, a steroid. (R. at 848, 1083a). 
5. Ulcerative colitis is a serious, potentially life 
threatening, inflammatory bowel disease. The cause of the disease 
is unknown. The standard medical therapy is Azulfadine, steroids 
and a regulated diet. (R. at 848). 
6. If the disease is not controlled by the standard medical 
therapies, surgery is necessary. Ulcerative colitis affects and is 
limited to the mucosal lining of the colon and rectum. 
Traditionally, the surgical treatment was removal of the colon and 
rectum and creation of an abdominal stoma and ileostomy. The 
retained small bowel was attached to the abdominal wall and emptied 
into a bag worn externally by the patient. (R. at 848-849). 
7. In the early 19 80s a new and promising surgical procedure 
was available for ulcerative colitis patients. This procedure, 
generally known as an ileoanal anastomosis or ileoanal pull through 
procedure involves the standard colectomy (removal of the colon), 
but only the mucosal lining of the rectum is removed, thus 
preserving the rectal muscle and anal sphincter function. A pouch 
(generally a "J" pouch) is created in the distal end of the small 
bowel and the bowel is connected to the rectum. (R. at 849). 
8. The above procedure is generally performed in two or 
three steps, requiring a temporary ileostomy. The obvious 
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advantages of this procedure over the traditional colectomy, 
proctectomy and ileostomy are (1) the patient does not permanently 
require an external appliance or bag and (2) the anal sphincter 
function and some degree of continence is maintained. (R. at 849) . 
9. With the new procedure, the surgical risk of damage to 
nerves controlling sexual function is theoretically decreased 
because the surgery in the rectal area is performed inside the 
rectum with the rectal muscle between the nerves and the operative 
site. However, sexual dysfunction has been reported following the 
procedure, but less often than with the traditional proctectomy. 
(R. at 849). 
10. In approximately 1982 plaintiff became aware of the 
ileoanal anastomosis procedure and that Dr. James Becker was 
performing this new procedure at the University of Utah. (R. at 
849-850). 
11. In November 1982 plaintiff consulted Dr. Becker at the 
University of Utah School of Medicine concerning surgical options 
for his ulcerative colitis, including specifically the ileoanal 
anastomosis procedure. (R. at 850, 1083a). 
12. Around Christmas time in 1982 or during the summer of 
1983 plaintiff's mother and father came from Alaska to Utah and 
visited with Dr. Becker concerning surgical options for treating 
plaintiff's ulcerative colitis and specifically concerning the 
ileoanal anastomosis procedure. (R. at 850, 1083a). 
13. In October 1983 plaintiff visited Dr. Kenneth Huizenga, 
a gastroenterologist at the Mayo Clinic in Rochester, Minnesota. 
Dr. Huizenga confirmed plaintiff's diagnosis of chronic ulcerative 
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colitis and plaintiff was accepted into a study protocol for 
investigation of a new drug (5ASA) for the treatment of ulcerative 
colitis. (R. at 850, 1083a). 
14. Plaintiff's disease did not respond favorably to the 5ASA 
therapy and Dr. Huizenga had no other medical treatment to offer. 
He arranged, however, a surgical consult for plaintiff with a 
colorectal surgeon at Mayo Clinic. Plaintiff met with Dr. Roger 
Dozois who explained the surgical options to him, including the 
ileoanal anastomosis. (R. at 850, 1083a). 
15. In December 19 83 plaintiff's ulcerative colitis could no 
longer be controlled by medical therapy and became so severe that 
he was admitted to Holy Cross Hospital by his treating 
gastroenterologist, Dr. Clifford Harman. In the opinion of Dr. 
Harman, medical therapies had been exhausted and surgery was 
necessary to save plaintiff's life. Dr. Harman recommended 
transfer to the University Hospital for surgery. (R. at 850, 
1083a). 
16. In January 1984 plaintiff and his parents discussed the 
surgical options with Dr. Becker. Plaintiff elected to undergo the 
ileoanal anastomosis procedure after having been informed 
concerning the risks and benefits of that procedure and of the 
alternative procedures. (R. at 851, 1048-1049, 1083a-1084, 1201-
1202, 1204, 1209-1210, 1224). 
17. Dr. Becker advised plaintiff that the risk of sexual 
dysfunction was lower with the ileoanal anastomosis procedure than 
with the alternative procedures, but that sexual dysfunction was a 
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risk of the procedure. (R. at 1048-1049, 1084, 1201-1202, 1204, 
1224)• 
18. In January 1984 Dr. Becker recommended performing the 
ileoanal anastomosis procedure in three steps because plaintiff was 
so ill. (R. at 851, 1084). 
19. On January 5, 1984, the first phase of the ileoanal 
anastomosis, removal of most of the colon and the creation of a 
temporary ileostomy, was performed by Dr. Becker on plaintiff. (R. 
at 851, 1084). 
20. The first phase of the procedure was completed without 
complications. Following completion of the first phase and prior 
to the second phase of the procedure, plaintiff claims he 
masturbated to test his sexual function. At that time he felt 
relieved and stated "at least I got through that one okay", 
referring to the first surgery. (R. at 1049-1050, 1084). 
21. On February 27, 1984, plaintiff underwent the second 
phase of the ileoanal anastomosis procedure, the mucosal 
proctectomy or removal of the mucosal lining from the rectum. 
Again, prior to this procedure the risks were explained to 
plaintiff by Dr. Becker, including the risk of sexual dysfunction. 
(R. at 851, 1084, 1224). 
22. In April or May 1984 plaintiff discovered what he 
perceived to be sexual dysfunction, including lack of ejaculation 
and diminished frequency and quality of erections. (R. at 851, 
923-929, 1047-1050, 1084, 1731, 1864-1869). 
23. In May 1984 plaintiff reported his perceived sexual 
dysfunction to his parents and to Dr. Becker. At that time he 
-7-
reported to Dr. Becker that he had been told by his family doctor 
that he might be impotent, secondary to his surgery. (R. at 882, 
923-929, 1047, 1085, 1152-1153, 1731, 1864-1869). 
24. In May 1984 Dr. Becker referred plaintiff to Dr. 
Middleton, a urologist, and to Dr. Hammond, a psychologist and sex 
therapist, to explore the reported sexual dysfunction. (R. at 953-
957, 1050, 1085, 1731, 1870-1873). 
25. Since April or May 1984, plaintiff has had ill defined 
sexual dysfunction, the cause of which has not been definitively 
determined. (R. at 1048, 1085). 
26. Beginning in May 1984, in discussions and correspondence 
with various physicians, plaintiff repeatedly causally related his 
perceived sexual dysfunction to his second operative procedure 
performed in February 1984. (R. at 1085). 
27. During the years 1984 and 1985 plaintiff considered suing 
defendants for medical malpractice based on his perceived sexual 
dysfunction and general dissatisfaction with the outcome of his 
surgeries. (R. at 905-906, 1052, 1086, 1319-1320, 1552, 1580-
1582) . 
28. On June 28, 1984 the third and final phase of the 
ileoanal anastomosis was performed (attachment of the small bowel 
to the rectum) and completed. (R. at 851, 1086). 
29. All surgeries and treatment performed and rendered by 
Defendants were provided at the University of Utah Medical Center. 
(R. at 851, 1086) . 
30. Within the State of Utah, this surgical procedure was 
available for adult patients only at the University Hospital and 
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Dr. Becker was the only physician in the state performing the 
procedure at the time plaintiff underwent his surgery. (R. at 
851) . 
31. Dr. Becker was at all times relevant hereto a full time 
employee and faculty member in the Department of Surgery at the 
University of Utah Medical Center. (R. at 463-464, 1086). 
32. Plaintiff's Notice of Intent to Commence Action was 
served on December 4# 1987. (R. at 3). 
33. A request for prelitigation review was filed by plaintiff 
on January 15, 1988. (R. at 3). 
34. This action was commenced on April 26, 1988. (R. at 2-
10) . 
35. After significant discovery, this matter was tried to the 
trial court, without a jury, on November 12, 13 and 25, 1991. In 
accordance with § 78-12-47, UCA (1953 as amended) the trial was 
limited to the issues pertaining to defendants' statute of 
limitations defense. (R. at 976). 
36. The trial court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law, dismissing plaintiff's claim, were entered on January 23, 
1992. (R. at 1083-1089). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1, Plaintiff has failed to meet his burden in his brief of 
marshalling all of the relevant evidence presented at trial which 
supports the trial court's Findings of Fact and demonstrating that 
despite this evidence, the trial court's findings are so lacking in 
support as to be against the clear weight of the evidence. 
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Instead, plaintiff has set forth those facts and testimony which he 
believes support his view of the facts and argues that there is 
evidence contradicting the trial court's Findings. When an 
appellant fails to meet this burden, the trial court's findings are 
accepted as valid. Thus, the trial court's Findings of Fact in 
this instance should be affirmed. 
2. The trial court's findings of fact, specifically those 
challenged by plaintiff, are valid and supported by the evidence 
and should be affirmed. The trial court's factual findings should 
be given considerable deference because of the trial court's 
ability to assess the witnesses credibility. 
The evidence established that plaintiff did not accept or rely 
upon any other theories of causation of his perceived problems. 
Moreover, plaintiff presented no evidence that he was ever misled 
or deceived about the cause of his problems. In fact, the evidence 
establishes that plaintiff believed that his problems were caused 
by his surgery and considered suing defendants during 1984 and 1985 
for medical malpractice based on his perceived sexual dysfunction. 
Plaintiff does not challenge the trial court's finding that 
since May 1984, in discussions and correspondence with various 
physicians, he repeatedly causally related his perceived sexual 
dysfunction to the second operative procedure performed in February 
1984. He also does not challenge the finding that in May 1984 he 
reported his perceived sexual dysfunction to his parents and Dr. 
Becker, and that he reported to Dr. Becker that he had been told by 
his family doctor that he might be impotent, secondary to his 
surgery. In light of these admitted facts, plaintiff's later claim 
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that he had no knowledge that his dysfunction was caused by the 
operation of February 1984 is without merit. 
There were numerous exhibits introduced into evidence at the 
trial of this matter which established that beginning in May 1984, 
and continuing thereafter, plaintiff knew and reasonably should 
have known that his second surgery in February 1984 was a possible 
cause of his perceived sexual dysfunction and that he might have a 
cause of action against defendants. Plaintiff has completely 
failed to address this evidence in his brief. 
Although plaintiff alleges that he did not discover his injury 
until his visit with Dr. Merrill Dayton on September 15, 1987, 
there is absolutely no evidence that he became aware of any 
information at this time that he did not already know in 1984 and 
1985. 
3. The trial court's interpretation of U.C.A. § 78-14-4 was 
based on recent cases decided by this Court, the Utah Supreme Court 
and the United States District Court for the District of Utah and 
was correct. The trial court correctly held that knowledge of an 
injury for purposes of the statute of limitations does not require 
an expert opinion confirming malpractice. In the absence of such 
a holding, the statute would be tolled in every case until a 
plaintiff not only decided to seek, but found favorable expert 
medical testimony. 
The trial court also correctly found that discovery of an 
injury occurs when a plaintiff knows or should have known that he 
might have a cause of action, and that plaintiff in this instance 
-11-
discovered "the injury" and made the causal connection between his 
problem and the surgery in April or May of 1984. 
In his brief, plaintiff relies primarily on the case of Foil 
v. Ballinger. 601 P. 2d 144 (Utah 1979) for his interpretation of 
U.C.A. § 78-14-4. However, plaintiff's reliance is misplaced due 
to decisions subsequent to Foil clarifying and further interpreting 
§ 78-14-4. In fact, plaintiff recognizes in his brief that Foil is 
no longer followed as precedent but essentially argues that the 
reasoning and analysis applied by the Utah Appellate Courts in 
every case decided since Foil is flawed and incorrect. 
The evidence presented at trial also established that 
plaintiff was fully aware of the nature, extent, severity and 
permanence of his perceived injuries. Nevertheless, the Utah 
Courts have specifically addressed this issue and held that a 
plaintiff need not know of the full nature, extent, severity and 
permanence of an injury for the statute to begin running. A 
plaintiff need only know he is suffering a disorder to begin the 
running of the statute of limitations, and need not know the extent 
of his injury, the actual malady suffered, or whether the injury is 
temporary or permanent. 
Plaintiff's claim that he must also know that his injury was 
the result of negligence is without merit. This is not the law 
with regard to § 78-14-4 and a requirement such as this would lead 
to absurd results. In essence, a legal determination of negligence 
would be required before the statute of limitations would run. 
This is contrary to the purpose behind the enactment of § 78-14-4. 
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4. The trial court's decision that the continuing treatment 
doctrine was inconsistent with § 78-14-4 and not applicable in Utah 
is correct. The "continuing treatment" doctrine has been adopted 
by some jurisdictions as a judicial doctrine to avoid the harsh 
result of a plaintiff's claim being barred before a plaintiff knows 
that there is a claim. The basis for the doctrine is to avoid 
those situations where discovery is delayed because of a continuing 
doctor/patient relationship. However, states which have adopted a 
discovery of injury statute of limitations for medical malpractice 
actions analogous to that adopted in Utah have rejected the 
continuous treatment doctrine as obsolete. 
The continuing treatment doctrine serves no purpose in Utah 
with the passage of § 78-14-4 and its two year discovery of injury 
provision; four year statute of repose; foreign object exception; 
and fraudulent concealment exception. 
5. The trial court's decision that the continuing treatment 
doctrine was not applicable, even in the absence of § 78-14-4, was 
correct. There was abundant evidence establishing that plaintiff 
had sufficient knowledge of his injury to commence the running of 
the statute of limitations as early as May 1984. The doctrine was 
not developed to toll the statute of limitations when a plaintiff 
knows he has a cause of action. Further, the trial court correctly 
found that plaintiff was not misled or prevented from discovering 
information about his alleged injuries as a result of any 
continuous course of medical treatment. 
One of the primary purposes for the continuing treatment 
doctrine is for a situation where no single incident in a 
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continuous chain of negligence can be identified as the cause of 
the harm. In such a situation, the doctrine is applied to prevent 
injustice. The continuing treatment doctrine would not serve such 
a purpose in this instance. Plaintiff himself contends the claims 
in this case result from one specific incident, the second surgery 
on February 27, 1984. 
6. The record before the court establishes that the trial 
court made its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law after a 
careful consideration of the evidence. Plaintiff's appeal from the 
trial court's decision is not grounded in fact, not warranted by 
existing law, and not based on a good faith argument to extend, 
modify, or reverse existing law. Rather, plaintiff's claims on 
appeal simply controvert the findings of the court. Thus, 
plaintiff's appeal is frivolous and defendant is entitled to the 
benefit of U.R.C.P., Rule 33(a). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
PLAINTIFF HAS FAILED TO MEET HIS BURDEN OF 
MARSHALLING THE EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT OF THE 
TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
DEMONSTRATING WHY THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS 
ARE LACKING IN SUPPORT. THUS, THE TRIAL 
COURT'S FINDINGS SHOULD BE ACCEPTED AS VALID 
AND AFFIRMED. 
It is plaintiff's burden in his brief to marshall all of the 
relevant evidence presented at trial which tends to support the 
trial court's Findings of Fact and then demonstrate that despite 
this evidence, the trial court's findings are so lacking in support 
as to be against the clear weight of the evidence. When an 
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appellant fails to meet this burden, the trial court's findings are 
accepted as valid. Saunders v. Sharp. 793 P.2d 927, 931 (Utah App. 
1990) . This Court has previously stated that this threshold burden 
is neither elective nor optional. Fitzgerald v. Critchfield. 744 
P.2d 301, 304 (Utah App. 1987). This Court has also held the 
following: 
This burden is a heavy one, reflective of the fact that 
we do not sit to retry cases submitted on disputed facts, 
(citation omitted) . Accordingly, when an appellant fails 
to carry its burden of marshalling the evidence, we 
refuse to consider the merits of challenges to the 
findings and accept the findings as valid. (citation 
omitted). 
Saunders v. Sharp, 793 P.2d 927, 931 (Utah App. 1990). 
Plaintiff has completely failed to meet his burden of 
marshalling the evidence. The trial brief which defendants 
submitted to the trial court contained 14 exhibits in support of 
the position that plaintiff's claim was barred by the statute of 
limitations, as well as 8 additional exhibits of deposition 
excerpts. (R. at 846-965). At the trial of this matter, 
defendants introduced 19 exhibits into evidence, as well as 
introducing deposition and live testimony. (R. at 1019) . As 
reflected in the Trial Court's Decision, dated December 18, 1991, 
the court relied on defendant's exhibits and the proffered 
testimony in reaching its' decision. (R. at 1046-1054; See 
Addendum "B"). 
In his brief, plaintiff has failed to marshall and address the 
aforementioned evidence submitted by defendants to the trial court. 
Instead, he has set forth those facts and testimony which he 
believes support his view of the facts and argues that there is 
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evidence contradicting the trial court's Findings. In fact# the 
majority of the evidence set forth in his brief is his own 
testimony, the credibility of which the trial court, and not this 
court, was obligated and permitted to assess. 
Because of his failure to properly marshall the evidence, 
plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that the trial court's Findings 
are against the clear weight of the evidence. This Court has 
"shown no reluctance to affirm when the appellant fails to 
adequately marshall the evidence". West Valley City v. Majestic 
Inv. Co. . 818 P.2d 1311, 1313 (Utah App. 1991) . The same result is 
warranted in this instance. Thus, the trial court's Findings of 
Fact must be accepted as valid and should be affirmed. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS OF FACT ARE 
SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE AND SHOULD BE 
AFFIRMED. 
As mentioned above, plaintiff has failed to carry his burden 
of marshalling the evidence. Because of this failure, the merits 
of plaintiff's challenges to the trial court's Findings should not 
be considered by this Court and the trial court's Findings should 
be accepted as valid. However, for argument purposes and without 
intending to waive the position stated under Point I above, 
defendants will address plaintiff's specific challenges to the 
trial court's Findings of Fact and set forth the evidence 
supporting each finding. 
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A. Findings of Fact 5, 6 and 10, 
Plaintiff's first challenge is to Findings of Fact numbered 5, 
6 and 10. These findings essentially state that plaintiff was 
fully informed of the risks and benefits of his surgery prior to 
undergoing the procedure, including the fact that sexual 
dysfunction was a risk of the procedure. 
Although plaintiff denies that he was informed of the risk of 
sexual dysfunction, the trial court, in the Court's Decision of 
December 18, 1991, held that this denial was not credible in view 
of the totality of the testimony, including plaintiff's own 
testimony that he considered and requested that his sperm be banked 
prior to the surgery. (R. at 1051) . In particular, the trial 
court held that plaintiff's articulated desire to have his sperm 
banked would not have been made but for his knowledge of the risk 
of sexual dysfunction. (R. at 1049). 
The trial court further noted that it considered plaintiff's 
demeanor and testimony, and found that his demeanor, attitude and 
the content of his answers revealed him to be an intelligent, 
careful man with a great attention to detail. The trial court also 
recognized that plaintiff was a lawyer and understood the concept 
of informed consent. (R. at 1049) . 
Findings of Fact 5, 6 and 10 are supported by the testimony 
presented to the trial court from Dr. Becker. This testimony 
established that Dr. Becker informed plaintiff of the risks of the 
surgery, including the risk of sexual dysfunction, and that 
plaintiff knew of this possibility before surgery. (R. at 1201-
1202, 1204, 1224) . Evidence was also presented to the trial court 
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establishing that plaintiff had access to, and read, a pamphlet 
from the Mayo clinic regarding the ileoanal anastomosis procedure. 
(R. at 1341-1342). This pamphlet stated that sexual dysfunction 
was a risk of the procedure. 
Plaintiff asserts in his brief that the issue of what 
plaintiff was informed of prior to trial is irrelevant. However, 
this issue was raised by plaintiff and is clearly relevant to when 
plaintiff became aware that his sexual dysfunction could have been 
caused by the surgery. Plaintiff's knowledge prior to his surgery 
is particularly relevant in light of plaintiff's continued 
representations that he had no reason to believe that his surgery 
could result in sexual dysfunction problems. Accordingly, the 
trial court's findings of fact numbered 5, 6 and 10 are supported 
by the evidence and should be affirmed. 
B. Findings of Fact 16 and 26. 
Plaintiff also challenges Findings of Fact 16 and 26. These 
two Findings will be addressed together due to there similarity and 
because of the common evidence supporting them. 
Finding of Fact 16 states that beginning in May 1984, and 
continuing thereafter, plaintiff knew and reasonably should have 
known that his second surgery in February was a possible cause of 
his perceived sexual dysfunction and that he might have a cause of 
action against defendants. Finding of Fact 26 states that 
plaintiff's action was not commenced within two years after he knew 
and reasonably should have known of his perceived sexual 
dysfunction and general dissatisfaction with the outcome of his 
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surgeries and that he might have a claim for malpractice against 
defendants. 
Plaintiff's challenge to these two Findings is based on his 
own testimony and his assertion that there is no evidence in the 
record supporting them. However, plaintiff completely ignores the 
abundant evidence presented to the trial court supporting Findings 
of Fact 16 and 26. 
The complaint in this matter was filed by plaintiff on 
April 26, 1988. (R. at 2-10). A request for prelitigation review, 
which tolls the statute of limitations, was filed by plaintiff on 
January 15, 1988. (R. at 3). The statute of limitations for 
medical malpractice actions is two years from the date the 
plaintiff discovers or should have discovered the injury. 
Therefore, if plaintiff discovered or should have discovered his 
injury prior to January 15, 1986 his case is time barred. 
In his brief, plaintiff states that he denied any knowledge 
that his dysfunction was caused by the operation of February 1984. 
(See Brief of Appellant, P. 13). He further alleges that he did 
not report his dysfunction problems to Dr. Becker because of any 
belief that they were caused by the surgery. Not only is there 
abundant evidence refuting plaintiff's denials, but these denials 
are particularly interesting in light of the fact that in his brief 
plaintiff has not challenged the trial court's Findings of Fact 12 
and 14. 
Finding of Fact 14 states that since May 1984, in discussions 
and correspondence with various physicians, plaintiff repeatedly 
causally related his perceived sexual dysfunction to the second 
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operative procedure performed in February 1984. Further, Finding 
of Fact 12 states that in May 1984 plaintiff reported his perceived 
sexual dysfunction to his parents and Dr. Becker, and that he 
reported to Dr. Becker that he had been told by his family doctor 
that he might be impotent, secondary to his surgery. In light of 
these accepted facts, plaintiff's denial that he had any knowledge 
that his dysfunction was caused by the operation of February 1984 
is unacceptable. 
The evidence overwhelmingly shows that plaintiff had knowledge 
of his "injury" as early as May 1984. There were numerous exhibits 
and abundant testimony introduced into evidence at the trial of 
this matter which established that plaintiff knew and reasonably 
should have known as early as 1984 that his second surgery in 
February 1984 was a possible cause of his perceived sexual 
dysfunction and that he might have a cause of action against 
defendants. Plaintiff has completely failed to address this 
evidence in his brief. The following is a list of exhibits and 
evidence introduced at trial which support the trial court's 
Findings of Fact 16 and 26: 
Defendants Trial Exhibit-1; Plaintiff Trial Exhibit-4: In 
the interim the patient now also complains of possible 
impotence. This patient is a very anxious young man and 
is concerned about his sexual function. . . . He states 
that he is concerned about impotence because prior to his 
surgery he had regular nocturnal erections and emissions. 
Since his second operation he states the frequency of 
these events has decreased. He was told by his family 
doctor that he might be impotent secondary to his 
surgery. (Excerpts from May 29, 1984 letter from Dr. 
James Becker to Dr. Richard Middleton) . (R. at 882, 
1152-1153, 1274). 
Defendants Trial Exhibit-3: In August 1984, plaintiff 
reports to Dr. Urry on his medical history form that his 
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sexual dysfunction problems were the result of his colon 
surgeries. (Deposition excerpts of Dr. Ronald L. Urry). 
(R. at 943-946, 2088, 2108-2110, 2112). 
Defendants Trial Exhibit-4: My basic problem is the 
result of my colon surgeries. I have had three surgeries 
for colitis: (1) partial removal of the colon Jan. 1984; 
(2) pull-through Feb. 1984; and (3) take down in June 
1984. I noticed a marked difference in my sexual arousal 
after the second surgery. Diminished ability to achieve 
an erection, no real orgasm, and no sperm ejaculate. 
(Mr. Jones also reports that he was able to obtain an 
erection easily before his surgery but not now, that he 
did have erections in the morning before his surgery but 
not now and that he was aware of his erections in the 
night before his surgery but not now.) (Medical History 
Form filled out by plaintiff, Fertility Evaluation 
Clinic, Division of Urology, University of Utah Medical 
Center, Dr. Ronald Urry, May 31, 1984) . (R. at 884-887, 
1283-1284). 
Defendants Trial Exhibit-6: As you know, the patient 
complained of impotence since February. . . . He 
indicated that by late February he sensed a "deadening" 
and lack of nocturnal emissions. (Excerpts from letter 
from D. Corydon Hammond, Ph.D. to James M. Becker, M.D. 
June 15, 1984). (R. at 889, 1523). 
Defendants Trial Exhibit-7; Patient has apparently been 
told that or came to the conclusion that the procedure 
has not been successful. (Records from the University of 
Utah Medical Center; Psychiatric consultation progress 
note; Dr. Richard Segal; July 2, 1984). (R. at 893-894, 
1523) . 
Defendants Trial Exhibit-10: I am a thirty-three year old 
male who has experienced sexual dysfunction problems 
following a pull-through procedure for chronic ulcerative 
colitis. . . . Specifically, I have a diminished ability 
to achieve an erection and more importantly no 
emission/ejaculation function. (Excerpts from letter 
from G. Kevin Jones to Dr. David Barrett, Mayo Clinic); 
(This letter is not dated but is prior to January 15, 
1985, based on the return letter from Dr. Barrett 
thanking Mr. Jones for his recent letter with regard to 
his problem with ejaculation following surgery for 
colitis). (R. at 899, 1285). 
Defendants Trial Exhibit-11; Since his second operation 
2/84 he has had very few erections, several which were 
adequate for penetration but not as strong as prior to 
2/84. (Records from University of Chicago Hospital and 
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Clinic; Urology Consultation; Dr. Franklin L. Smith; 
March 28, 1985). (R. at 902, 1289-1291). 
Defendants Trial Exhibit-13; Kevin's main problem at this 
point, as you know, is sterility. . . . He is convinced 
that the problem is not psychological and was told this 
by a psychiatrist in Chicago. Another physician 
(urologist) told him that he thought the "cord had been 
cut". (Dr. James Becker's office records; Terri Stoker, 
patient advocate for Dr. Becker, July 23, 1985) . (R. at 
905-906, 1297-1299). 
Defendants Trial Exhibit-15; Mr. Jones has asked that I 
write you regarding my findings and recommendations 
regarding his genitourinary system. . . . Since his 
second rectal surgical procedure, he has decreasing 
ability to get penile erection. He also has had failure 
of ejaculation. . . . The sensation of orgasm also has 
markedly decreased since his rectal surgery of March in 
19 84. He is able to get an erection but it is not as 
large or as hard as it was before surgery. . . . I had a 
long discussion with him regarding his failure of seminal 
emission and ejaculation and have told him that I would 
not advise that he pursue any claims to do nerve repair 
in this area because it is likely to make him worse and 
possibly make him lose his erection mechanism totally. . 
. . I have explained to him that the expected by product 
of his colon surgery to save his life is the unfortunate 
loss of his ejaculatory mechanism. (Excerpts from 
September 4, 1985 letter from Dr. Ned Mangelson to Dr. 
Clifford Harman; this information is also found in the 
Salt Lake Clinic, Department of Urology, Office Notes of 
Dr. Ned Mangelson, August 29, 1985). (R. at 913, 915-
916, 1291-1294, 1308-1309, 1321). 
Defendants Trial Exhibit-15; Orgasm: Markedly decreased 
since rectal surgery of March of 1984. Impotence: No 
more nocturnal erections. Is able to get erections but 
not as hard or large as before surgery. Work up & 
Disposition: Discussed advisability of marrying as 
desired at appropriate time and if erections insufficient 
consider prosthesis. (Salt Lake Clinic, Department of 
Urology, History and Physical by Dr. Ned Mangelson, 
August 8, 1985). (R. at 908-911, 1291-1294). 
Defendants Trial Exhibit-16; Enclosed is a letter to my 
primary care physician, Dr. Harman, from a Salt Lake 
urologist that describes the sexual dysfunction problems 
that I have experienced since I underwent multiple 
surgical procedures. . . The surgeries have left me with 
a diminished ability to achieve an erection and no 
ejaculation. . . . It has been his opinion (Dr. Becker's) 
that the problem is psychological but I know this is not 
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the case. Immediately after the pull-through, I noticed 
the problem and it is nearly two years since the problem 
developed (March 1983 date of surgery). (Excerpts from 
September 30, 1985 letter from G. Kevin Jones to Dr. 
Roger Dozois, Mayo Clinic). (R. at 918, 1306-1308, 1322-
1324) . 
Plaintiff's reports to physicians and health care providers in 
1984 and 1985 clearly establish that plaintiff knew and reasonably 
should have known that his second surgery in February 1984 was a 
possible cause of his perceived sexual dysfunction and that he 
might have a cause of action against defendants. Moreover, 
plaintiff's claim that he did not discover his injury prior to 1987 
is particularly inconceivable when reviewing the letters plaintiff 
himself wrote. The only plausible conclusion from these letters is 
that plaintiff had made the connection between his surgeries and 
his symptoms in 1984. 
Plaintiff's letter of September 30, 1985, to Dr. Dozois at the 
Mayo Clinic, clearly states that plaintiff attributed his sexual 
dysfunction problems to his surgeries. In fact, plaintiff states 
in the letter that he noticed the problem immediately after his 
surgery in March of 1983 (this should be 1984) and that he knew 
that the problem was not psychological. (R. at 918, 1306-1308, 
1322-1324). In addition, plaintiff's letter to Dr. Barrett at the 
Mayo Clinic also indicates that plaintiff attributed his sexual 
dysfunction problems to his surgery in 1984. (R. at 899, 1285). 
Along with the numerous references from the medical records 
mentioned above, there was also deposition and live testimony 
presented to the trial court further establishing and supporting 
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the fact that plaintiff had knowledge of his injury over two years 
prior to filing his action. 
In fact, plaintiff admitted in his testimony before the trial 
court that he expressed the concern to Dr. Mangelson in August 1985 
that his surgery had caused his sexual dysfunction problems. (R. 
at 1303-1304). Dr. Mangelson confirmed this in his deposition. 
(R. at 1285). Plaintiff also testified in his deposition, taken 
November 28, 1990, that he first became concerned about his sexual 
dysfunction problems sometime between his second and third 
surgeries (between March 1984 and June 1984). (R. at 923-929, 
1731, 1864-1869). He raised these concerns to his mother and to a 
resident or intern at the University, who passed the information on 
to Dr. Becker. (R. at 923-929, 1731, 1864-1869). 
Dr. Corydon Hammond also testified in his deposition that he 
first saw plaintiff on June 11, 1984 and that plaintiff complained 
at that time of not being able to obtain erections since his 
surgery in February 1984. (R. at 939-941, 1525). Additionally, 
the deposition testimony of Dr. Franklin Smith, a urologist at the 
University of Chicago Hospital and Clinic, establishes that in 
early 19 85 plaintiff reported sexual problems starting "after the 
second operation in February 1984." (R. at 1289-1291, 1541). 
Plaintiff testified before the trial court that at the time he saw 
Dr. Smith in early 1985 he was seeking an answer to the question of 
whether his sexual dysfunction was caused by the surgery. (R. at 
1485-1486). 
Finally, Dr. Clifford Harman, a gastroenterologist who 
regularly treated plaintiff, testified in his deposition that 
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plaintiff clearly felt that his problems were related to something 
that had gone wrong with the surgery and that plaintiff had 
reported this concern to him as early as December 1984. (R. at 
1914, 2010-2011, 1311-1314). 
Each of the above references to medical records or testimony 
would be sufficient evidence on its own to establish that plaintiff 
made the connection between his surgeries and his symptoms and knew 
he may have a cause of action against a health care provider as 
early as May 1984. When considering the aforementioned references 
in total, plaintiff's claim that he did not discover his injury 
prior to September 1987 is inconceivable. The only conceivable 
interpretation from the numerous entries above is that plaintiff 
was attributing his sexual dysfunction problems to his surgery, and 
had come to this conclusion as early as 1984. 
Although plaintiff alleges that he did not discover his injury 
until his visit with Dr. Merrill Dayton on September 15, 1987, 
there is absolutely no evidence that he became aware of any 
information at this time that he did not already know in 1984 and 
19 85. In fact, Dr. Dayton testified before the trial court that he 
did not tell plaintiff that a complication from his surgery was the 
most likely cause of his sexual dysfunction. (R. at 1173). 
It is clear from the abundant evidence presented to the trial 
court that plaintiff knew and reasonably should have known as early 
as 1984 that his second surgery in February 1984 was a possible 
cause of his perceived sexual dysfunction and that he might have a 
cause of action against defendants. Since plaintiff's action was 
not commenced within two years after he obtained such knowledge, 
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his claim was appropriately dismissed by the trial court. 
Accordingly, the trial court's Findings of Fact 16 and 26 are 
adequately supported by the evidence and should be affirmed. 
C. Finding of Fact 17. 
Finding of Fact 17 states that "plaintiff did not accept or 
rely upon any other theories of causation suggested by defendants 
or any other physicians. Specifically, plaintiff rejected and did 
not rely upon any suggestion that there may be a psychological 
cause of his perceived sexual dysfunction." Plaintiff's challenge 
to this finding is primarily his own testimony that he followed the 
advise of Dr. Becker and sought additional treatment based on Dr. 
Becker's representation that plaintiff's problem was psychological. 
(See Brief of Appellant, p. 14). However, the clear and abundant 
evidence presented to the trial court indicates otherwise. 
To begin with, plaintiff's challenge to Finding 17 is also 
interesting (as was his challenge to Findings 16 and 26 above) in 
light of the fact that he has not challenged Finding of Fact 14; 
which states that since May 1984, in discussions and correspondence 
with various physicians, plaintiff repeatedly causally related his 
perceived sexual dysfunction to the second operative procedure 
performed in February 1984. Further, the evidence presented above 
concerning Findings 16 and 26 clearly establishes that as early as 
May 19 84 plaintiff attributed the cause of his problems to his 
surgery in February 1984. It is clear from this evidence that 
plaintiff did not accept or rely upon any other theories of 
causation. 
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The evidence supporting Finding 17 includes a July 23, 1985 
memorandum from Terri Stoker, patient advocate for Dr. Becker, 
which stated that plaintiff's main problem at the time was 
sterility and that plaintiff was "convinced that the problem is not 
psychological and was told this by a psychiatrist in Chicago." (R. 
at 905-906, 1297-1299, 1323-1324). Further, plaintiff recorded the 
very same thought in a letter that he wrote on September 30, 1985 
to Dr. Roger Dozois at the Mayo Clinic in Rochester, Minnesota: 
Enclosed is a letter to my primary care physician, Dr. 
Harman, from a Salt Lake urologist that describes the 
sexual dysfunction problems that I have experienced since 
I underwent multiple surgical procedures. . . The 
surgeries have left me with a diminished ability to 
achieve an erection and no ejaculation. . . . It has been 
his opinion (Dr. Becker's) that the problem is 
psychological but I know this is not the case, (emphasis 
added). Immediately after the pull-through, I noticed 
the problem and it is nearly two years since the problem 
developed (March 1983 date of surgery)." (R. at 918, 
1306-1308, 1322-1324). 
Plaintiff also testified that he found Dr. Corydon Hammond's 
explanation, of a possible psychological cause for the dysfunction, 
incredible and "unsatisfactory" and never believed this to be the 
cause. (R. at 1472) . Moreover, the fact that plaintiff failed to 
pursue further psychological treatment despite recommendations that 
he should makes it clear that he did not believe his problem to be 
psychological. (R. at 415-417, 1333). Accordingly, Finding of 
Fact 17 is clearly supported by the evidence and should be 
affirmed. 
D. Findings of Fact 18 and 19. 
Findings of Fact 18 and 19 state that Jones was not misled or 
deceived concerning the possible causes of his perceived sexual 
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dysfunction and that defendants did not fraudulently represent or 
conceal any information relevant to plaintiff's treatment, recovery 
or perceived sexual dysfunction. In support of his challenge to 
these findings, plaintiff states that Dr. Becker discounted any 
possibility that the surgery was the cause of his dysfunction, that 
defendants never told him that the surgery caused permanent sexual 
dysfunction and that defendants denied any causation between the 
surgery and plaintiff's problems. Even if the trial court assumed 
these assertions to be true, plaintiff does not present any 
evidence of misrepresentation, deception or fraudulent concealment 
on the part of defendants. 
Although plaintiff argues that he was never told that the 
surgery caused permanent sexual dysfunction and that defendants 
denied any causation between the surgery and plaintiff's problems, 
he states later in his brief that "the record demonstrates that 
Becker really didn't know whether Jones' sexual dysfunctions were 
in any way related to the surgery". (See Brief of Appellant, p. 
33) . He also notes that Dr. Becker is still uncertain of the cause 
of plaintiff's problems, was not certain if plaintiff had a sexual 
dysfunction problem at all, and also characterized plaintiff's 
problems as "ill-defined". (See Brief of Appellant, p. 25, 33). 
It is incongruous for plaintiff to claim on the one hand that he 
was misled by defendants as to the cause of his problems and then 
later admit that defendants were, and still are, uncertain as to 
what that cause is. 
As the trial court appropriately noted, plaintiff presented no 
evidence at trial that he was ever misled or deceived about the 
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cause of his problems. (R. at 1722). In fact, the abundant 
evidence presented clearly establishes that plaintiff believed that 
his problems were caused by his surgery. As previously noted, the 
trial court record is replete with evidence that since May 1984, in 
discussions and correspondence with various physicians, plaintiff 
repeatedly causally related his perceived sexual dysfunction to his 
second surgery in February 1984. 
Moreover, plaintiff admits in his own deposition that Dr. 
Becker referred him to Dr. Hammond, a psychologist/sex therapist, 
and Dr. Middleton, a urologist, for the express purpose of helping 
him with his complaints of urological and sexual problems. (R. at 
953-957, 1731, 1870-1873). Plaintiff had his first visit to Dr. 
Hammond on June 11, 1984, and his first visit to Dr. Middleton on 
May 31, 1984. In addition, Dr. Becker referred plaintiff to Dr. 
Joel Bauer, a colorectal surgeon in New York. Plaintiff also 
admits in his deposition that the purpose of this referral was 
because Dr. Bauer specialized in working with sexual dysfunction 
problems. (R. at 959-961, 965, 2188, 2225-2226). 
If Dr. Becker were trying to mislead plaintiff as to the cause 
of his alleged problems, he certainly would not be referring him to 
specialists to help him with his complaints. Accordingly, Findings 
of Fact 18 and 19 are supported by the evidence and should be 
affirmed. 
E. Finding of Fact 20. 
Finding of Fact 20 states that during 1984 and 1985 plaintiff 
considered suing defendants for medical malpractice based on his 
perceived sexual dysfunction and general dissatisfaction with the 
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outcome of his surgeries. This finding is supported by the 
testimony of Terri Stoker and her memorandum of July 23, 1985, 
which she prepared while working as a patient advocate for Dr. 
Becker. (R. at 905-906, 1319-1320, 1552, 1580-1582). In her 
memorandum and testimony she states that plaintiff told her that he 
"contemplated suing" (defendants) repeatedly and that plaintiff's 
threats of a lawsuit were made as early as 1985. (R. at 905-906, 
1552, 1580-1582). Accordingly, Finding 20 is supported by the 
evidence and should be affirmed. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURTS CONCLUSIONS OF LAW ARE 
CORRECT. THUS, PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM IS TIME 
BARRED AND WAS PROPERLY DISMISSED BY THE TRIAL 
COURT. 
A. The trial court's interpretation of U.C.A. § 78-14-4 was 
correct. 
1. A plaintiff need not be aware of the full nature, 
extent and permanence of his injuries. 
The statute of limitations for medical malpractice actions in 
Utah is contained in the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act, Utah 
Code Annotated § 78-14-4, which provides in pertinent part: 
No malpractice action against a health care provider may 
be brought unless it is commenced within two years after 
the plaintiff or patient discovers, or through the use of 
reasonable diligence should have discovered the injury, 
whichever first occurs, . . . . 
The critical question concerning the interpretation of § 78-14-4, 
and the issue addressed in the majority of the cases, is what the 
phrase "discovery of injury" means. This issue was also addressed 
by the trial court in this instance. 
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The trial court's interpretation of U.C.A. § 78-14-4 in this 
instance, and of the phrase "discovery of injury", was based on 
recent case precedent from this court. The trial court noted in 
its Decision that it was clear from this Court's opinion in 
Deschamps v. Pulley. 784 P.2d 471 (Utah App. 1989) that knowledge 
of an injury does not require an expert opinion confirming 
malpractice. (R. at 1047). The trial court further found that 
discovery of an injury occurs when a plaintiff knows or should have 
known that he might have a cause of action, and that plaintiff 
discovered "the injury" and made the causal connection between his 
problem and the surgery in April or May of 1984. (R. at 1048). 
Utah Courts, including this Court in Floyd v. Western Surgical 
Associates, 773 P.2d 401 (Utah App. 1989), have affirmed a trial 
court's grant of summary judgment in situations with evidence far 
less compelling than this instance. In Floyd, the trial court 
based its decision that plaintiff's case was time barred almost 
solely on the plaintiff's deposition testimony. In his deposition, 
plaintiff stated that he had informed one of his doctors over two 
years prior to his lawsuit that his problems were probably caused 
by surgery he received from his treating doctor (the defendant). 
Based on plaintiff's testimony, the trial court granted summary 
judgment for the defendant. This Court affirmed. 
In Reiser v. Lohner, 641 P.2d 93 (Utah 1982), the Supreme 
Court upheld the trial court's grant of summary judgment based on 
a single affidavit. In Reiser, the evidence that the case was time 
barred consisted primarily of a single affidavit from plaintiff's 
husband in which he asserted a belief that his wife's disorders 
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were temporary and that he did not become aware of any permanent 
damage until later. 
In his brief, plaintiff asserts that the trial court erred in 
its interpretation and application of U.C.A. § 78-14-4. 
Specifically, plaintiff alleges that the trial court improperly 
applied the requirements set forth in Foil v. Ballinger, 601 P.2d 
144 (Utah 1979). (See Brief of Appellant, p. 17). Plaintiff 
asserts that one of the requirements under Foil is that a plaintiff 
understand the full nature, extent, severity and permanency of his 
condition. However, as this Court is aware, plaintiff's reliance 
on Foil is misplaced due to the decisions subsequent to Foil 
clarifying and further interpreting § 78-14-4. 
In Foil, the plaintiff underwent surgery for back problems. 
Following surgery, the plaintiff was in a pain clinic and received 
a subarachnoid block, a block of anesthetic into the subarachnoid 
space in the spinal column. She then suffered symptoms of bladder 
and rectal problems which led to a total colectomy. Summary 
judgment was granted by the trial court based on the running of the 
statute of limitations. 
On appeal, the plaintiff claimed that she had no knowledge of 
any connection between the subarachnoid block and the symptoms of 
bladder and rectal dysfunction. There was no evidence to the 
contrary in that case and the Supreme Court reversed. The Court's 
holding in Foil is consistent with the later cases but the decision 
produced some unfortunate language which was subsequently 
addressed. 
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Foil is one of the first cases addressing the meaning of the 
phrase "discovery of injury". Although Foil was not explicitly 
overruled, subsequent decisions by this Court and the Utah Supreme 
Court have modified and clarified the holding in Foil. Foil held 
that an injury is discovered, and the statute begins to run, "when 
an injured person knows or should know that he has suffered a legal 
injury." Id. at 147. A two prong test was enunciated by the 
court. A legal injury is discovered when a plaintiff knows or 
should have known (1) that he or she has sustained an injury, and 
(2) that the injury was caused by negligence. However, due to the 
absurd results that would have resulted from the literal 
application of this standard, the Utah Courts quickly began to 
broaden the standard. Essentially, if the language from Foil would 
have been adhered to, the statute of limitations for medical 
malpractice actions would not begin to run until there had been a 
legal determination of negligence. 
Soon after Foil, in Hove v. McMaster, 621 P.2d 694 (Utah 
1980) , the Supreme Court had an opportunity to look at the same 
issue again. Hove was decided approximately one year after Foil 
and both opinions were written by Justice Stewart. Hove involved 
a case against a dentist who had given the plaintiff two injections 
for a filling. Following the injections, the plaintiff suffered 
some pain and tingling which she claimed she did not know were 
caused by the injections. She consulted the defendant about her 
problems one year after the treatment and was referred to a 
neurologist. 
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The neurologist informed plaintiff that her problems could be 
caused by one of four things, including the fact that it may be a 
complication from the dental injections given by the defendant. 
Over the next several years, the plaintiff visited several doctors 
due to her recurring pain and tingling. In each case she told the 
doctors about the dental injections but none of the doctors 
specifically attributed her problems to the injections. Finally, 
she went to a physician who told her that her problems were the 
result of the dental injections given by the defendant dentist. 
The statute of limitations was raised as a defense and a 
bifurcated trial like that held in this instance was held to 
address that issue. The trial court held that plaintiff's action 
was barred by the statute of limitations and the Supreme Court 
affirmed. In upholding the trial court's decision, the Supreme 
Court held that the discovery of injury test was satisfied if the 
plaintiff knew or should have known "that the injury she suffered 
may have been caused by negligence on the part of the defendant." 
Id. at 69 7. Thus, under Hove, a plaintiff need only know of the 
possibility of a causal connection between her injury and the 
alleged negligent act. 
Hove was relied upon by this Court in its recent decision in 
Deschamps v. Pulley, 784 P.2d 471 (Utah App. 1989) . In Peschamps, 
this Court was faced with the same argument made to the Supreme 
Court in Hove; that a plaintiff does not know of her legal injury 
until she receives an expert medical opinion confirming 
malpractice. Plaintiff essentially makes the same argument in this 
instance. This Court rejected that argument as being inconsistent 
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with the purpose of the statute of limitations statutory scheme; 
noting that if plaintiff's argument were accepted the statute would 
be tolled in every case until a plaintiff not only decided to seek, 
but found favorable expert testimony. Jd. at 475. 
This Court further discussed the interpretation of "discovery 
of injury" in Floyd v. Western Surgical Associates, 773 P.2d 401 
(Utah App. 1989). In Floyd, the plaintiff consulted a Dr. Wilcox 
in November of 1981 for severe heartburn. Dr. Wilcox referred the 
plaintiff to a Dr. Lindem for hiatal hernia surgery. The surgery 
was done by Dr. Lindem on December 9, 1981. However, Dr. Lindem 
performed two other surgical procedures of which the plaintiff was 
unaware of at that time. 
After experiencing stomach pains over the next several months, 
the plaintiff consulted Dr. Lindem who at that time told him of the 
additional surgeries he had performed. This was in March or April 
of 1982. The plaintiff testified in his deposition that this was 
the first time he learned of the additional surgeries and that he 
knew at this time that these additional surgeries were the cause of 
his upset stomach and other problems. The plaintiff also testified 
that, in September of 1982, he informed Dr. Wilcox that Dr. Lindem 
had performed additional surgeries and that his problems were 
probably caused by the surgery. 
The complaint was filed in March of 1986. In July of 1987 the 
trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, 
holding that the claim was time barred. This Court affirmed, 
stating the following reasoning: 
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In this case, unlike Foil. Floyd's deposition testimony 
establishes that Floyd was aware in September of 1982 
that Dr. Lindem performed surgery in addition to the 
hiatal hernia surgery and that his symptoms were caused 
by the additional surgery. In contrast to Foil. Floyd 
had made the connection between the surgery and his 
symptoms, according to his clear deposition testimony. 
Therefore, by September 1982, at the latest, Floyd 
discovered or should have discovered the injury and that 
the additional surgical procedures caused his injury. 
Id. at 404. 
Finally, in Harcrett v. Limbercr. 598 F.Supp. 152 (D.Utah 1984) , 
Judge Winder provided a succinct and logical analysis of the test 
to be applied in determining when the statute of limitations begins 
to run in medical malpractice cases: 
Under Foil. and its progeny, a legal determination of 
negligence is not necessary to start the statute of 
limitations. Rather, the crucial question was whether 
the plaintiff was aware of the facts that would lead a 
reasonable person to conclude that he may have a cause of 
action against the health care provider. See, e.g.. 
Reiser v. Lohner. 641 P.2d 93, 99 (Utah 1982); Hove v. 
McMaster, 621 P.2d 694, 696 (Utah 1980); Foil, 601 P.2d 
at 148. Those facts include the existence of an injury, 
its cause and the possibility of negligence. 
Id. at 155. 
Based on the above mentioned decisions rendered subsequent to Foil. 
which clarified the interpretation of U.C.A. § 78-14-4, plaintiff's 
reliance in his brief on Foil is misplaced. 
In fact, plaintiff recognizes in his brief that Foil is no 
longer followed as precedent and notes that "subsequent Appellate 
Court decisions . . . have ignored the Supreme Court's instruction 
(in Foil) and have held that the requisite "knowledge" the 
plaintiff must have to satisfy the Foil test is mere awareness of 
a temporary disorder, Reiser v. Lohner. 641 P.2d 93 (Utah 1982); 
Duerden v. Utah Valley Hospital. 663 F.Supp. 781 (D.Utah 1987); or 
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the mere belief that a patient's symptoms were unavoidable side 
effects of treatment, Floyd v. Western Surgical Associates, 773 
P.2d 401 (Utah App. 1989); Deschamps v. Pulley. 784 P.2d 471 (Utah 
App. 1989)." See Brief at 19. Plaintiff further adds that the 
above cited cases "have misapplied the Foil "knowledge of injury" 
test . . . ." (See Brief of Appellant, p. 19). Finally, plaintiff 
later states in his brief that "the District Court's decision 
erroneously interpreted Foil to mean that the statute runs from two 
years when a plaintiff knew or should have known that he had 
suffered an injury which may have been caused by Defendants." (See 
Brief of Appellant, p. 43). 
In making the above statements, plaintiff is asserting that 
the reasoning and analysis applied in every case decided since Foil 
is flawed and incorrect. Additionally, by criticizing the trial 
court's interpretation of § 78-14-4 plaintiff is in essence 
criticizing those decisions relied on by the trial court in 
reaching its decision. As mentioned above, the trial court relied 
upon recent decisions by this Court and other Utah courts in its 
interpretation of § 78-14-4. Instead of addressing those cases 
decided subsequent to Foil, plaintiff relies on language from Foil 
which does not represent an accurate interpretation of § 78-14-4. 
For example, plaintiff argues that the knowledge of injury 
prong enunciated in Foil is not met until a plaintiff knows the 
full nature, extent, severity and permanence of the injury. 
Plaintiff further asserts that he was not aware of the full nature, 
extent, severity and permanence of his injury until he was told so 
by Dr. Dayton in September 19 87. However, the record before the 
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trial court establishes that plaintiff was reporting to medical 
providers as early as April or May of 1984 that he attributed his 
sexual problems to his second surgery in February 1984. Moreover, 
Dr. Dayton testified before the trial court that he did not tell 
plaintiff that a complication from his surgery was the most likely 
cause of his sexual dysfunction. (R. at 1173). 
Plaintiff's argument also fails because the evidence presented 
at trial clearly established that plaintiff was fully aware of the 
nature, extent, severity and permanence of his perceived injuries. 
This evidence was previously addressed above when discussing the 
trial court's Findings of Fact. Additionally, this Court, the Utah 
Supreme Court and the United States District Court for the District 
of Utah have specifically addressed this issue and held that a 
plaintiff need not know the full nature, extent, severity and 
permanence of an injury for the statute of limitations to begin 
running. 
In Reiser v. Lohner, 641 P.2d 93 (Utah 1982) , the Utah Supreme 
Court addressed the very argument plaintiff makes in his brief; 
that he believed his injuries were temporary and was not aware of 
their permanent nature until 1987. The Supreme Court rejected the 
argument that the statute of limitations does not run because of a 
belief that the injury was temporary. In doing so, the Court 
stated: 
Mr. Reiser filed an affidavit wherein he asserted a 
belief that his wife's disorders were temporary and that 
he did not become aware of any permanent damage until 
June, 1972. Such declaration of his belief was not 
sufficient to raise an issue of fact. Furthermore, the 
very acknowledgment that his wife was suffering disorders 
as a result of the incident (whether temporary or 
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permanent) would show that plaintiffs should have known 
that they had suffered legal injury at the time of the 
cardiac arrest. 
Id. at 100. 
This very same issue was also addressed by the Federal 
District Court in Duerden v. Utah Valley Hospital. 663 F.Supp. 781 
(D.Utah 1987), where Judge Greene interpreted Utah law and relied 
on the Reiser case. In Duerden, plaintiff argued that his lack of 
knowledge that the injury was permanent and his belief in its 
temporary nature tolled the statute of limitations. Judge Greene 
rejected this argument and held that a plaintiff need only know he 
is suffering a disorder to begin the running of the statute of 
limitations. Id. at 784 (emphasis added). The Court added the 
following: 
Under Reiser, the threshold knowledge the injured party 
must have to satisfy the first prong of the Foil test is 
knowledge that she is suffering a "disorder." Under this 
view, the statute begins to run upon acquisition of such 
knowledge, whether or not the injured party is aware of 
the extent of her injury, the actual malady suffered, or 
the permanent nature of her symptoms. 
Id. at 784. 
Thus, knowledge of a disorder, whether temporary or permanent, is 
sufficient to start the statute of limitations in medical 
malpractice actions. 
Finally, this Court addressed a similar argument in Deschamps 
v. Pulley, 784 P.2d 471 (Utah App. 1989) . In Deschamps, this Court 
addressed the daughter's argument that the she did not know of her 
mother's legal injury because she was led to believe her mother's 
death was the result of unavoidable side effects. 
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Plaintiff has similarly argued in this instance that, despite 
his knowledge of his alleged injury and its cause, he did not 
discover a legal injury for purposes of the statute of limitations 
because he was misled by Dr. Becker as to the cause of his injury. 
This argument was previously addressed above when responding to 
plaintiff's challenge to Findings of Fact 18 and 19. However, even 
if plaintiff's allegations that he was misled were true, although 
there is absolutely no evidence supporting them, this Court 
rejected such an argument in Peschamps: 
This court recently upheld the granting of summary 
judgment under section 78-14-4, finding that the 
plaintiff as a matter of law knew that his injuries were 
caused by medical malpractice more than two years before 
he filed his complaint. Floyd v. Western Surgical 
Assocs. , Inc. , 773 P.2d 401, 405 (UtahCt.App. 1989). We 
rejected the plaintiff's argument that he did not know of 
his legal injury because he was led to believe his 
symptoms were unavoidable side effects of his treatment. 
Id. at 403. Again, this court previously has rejected 
the position urged by Ms. Deschamps that she did not know 
of her mother's legal injury because she was led to 
believe her mother's death was the result of unavoidable 
side effects. 
Id. at 474. 
[Plaintiff also relies on the case of Christiansen v. Rees, 20 Utah 
2d 199, 436 P.2d 435 (Utah 1968), for the proposition that the 
plaintiff must know of the permanence of the injury. However, this 
case arose under the old four year statute of limitations (§ 78-12-
25(2)) and involved leaving a surgical needle in the plaintiff's 
body. Thus, Christiansen has no application to the facts in this 
instance.] 
Despite the utter lack of supporting evidence, and the 
substantial evidence to the contrary, plaintiff continues to assert 
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throughout his brief that although he was generally aware of a 
medical problem, he was not aware of the nature and extent of his 
injuries. He further asserts that he relied on the representations 
by defendants that his problem was temporary and was not caused by 
the surgery. However, these assertions are absurd in light of the 
evidence presented to the trial court that as early as May 1984 
plaintiff was attributing the cause of his perceived sexual 
dysfunction to his surgery in February 1984. 
Finally, plaintiff asserts in a footnote that he should not be 
held to have knowledge of his injury because the trial court and 
defendants doctors cannot agree on whether plaintiff actually 
suffered an injury. This argument fails for several reasons. 
First, it is plaintiff's perception of his injuries that is 
evaluated for purposes of the running of the statute of 
limitations, not the trial court's or defendants. As discussed, 
the evidence is clear that plaintiff believed he suffered an 
injury. Second, the question of whether plaintiff has suffered an 
injury goes to the merits of plaintiff's malpractice claim and not 
to the statute of limitations issue. 
2. A plaintiff need not have knowledge that his injuries are 
the result of negligence. 
Plaintiff also argues in his brief that the statute of 
limitations does not run until a plaintiff has knowledge of the 
cause of his injury and knows that the injury was the result of 
improper treatment. The first question of whether plaintiff knew 
of the cause of his alleged sexual dysfunction has been fully 
addressed above. As noted, the evidence is clear that plaintiff 
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was attributing the cause of his problems to his second surgery in 
February 19 84 and that he became aware of this knowledge no later 
than May 1984. 
Plaintiff's claim that he must also know that his injury was 
the result of negligence is without merit. As reviewed above, this 
is not the law with regard to § 78-14-4. For obvious reasons, a 
requirement such as this would lead to absurd results. In essence, 
an admission or a legal determination of negligence would be 
required before the statute of limitations would run. This is 
certainly contrary to the purpose behind the enactment of § 78-14-
4. In Deschamps, this Court stated the following when faced with 
the argument that a plaintiff does not know of her legal injury 
until she receives an expert medical opinion confirming 
malpractice: 
If we accepted Ms. Deschamps's position that she could 
not know of her legal injury until she received an expert 
medical opinion confirming malpractice, the statute would 
be tolled in every case until a plaintiff not only 
decided to seek, but found favorable expert medical 
testimony. We do not believe this result is consistent 
with the purpose of the statutory scheme. 
Id. at 475. 
The remainder of plaintiff's argument with regard to this 
issue is essentially the same as that made previously in his brief; 
that he was told the surgery was not the cause of his problems, 
that he relied on defendants, and that he did not have knowledge of 
his injury until his visit with Dr. Dayton on September 15, 1987. 
Since these allegations have been previously addressed above, 
defendants will not address them further. However, it should be 
noted that plaintiff's version of what Dr. Dayton told him is not 
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supported by Dr. Dayton's testimony. Dr. Dayton testified before 
the trial court that he did not tell plaintiff that a complication 
from his surgery was the most likely cause of his sexual 
dysfunction. (R. at 1173). It is clear that plaintiff learned 
nothing from his visit with Dr. Dayton that he did not already 
know. 
B. The trial court's decision that the continuing treatment 
doctrine was inconsistent with § 78-14-4 and not applicable in Utah 
was correct. 
Plaintiff's next argument in his brief is that the trial court 
erred in finding, as a matter of law, that the "continuing 
treatment" doctrine was inconsistent with the statute of 
limitations passed by the legislature and was not applicable since 
the passage of this section (§ 78-14-4). The trial court's 
decision on this issue was based on the trial briefs presented by 
the parties and the arguments of counsel at trial. It should be 
noted that plaintiff cited no Utah authority in his trial brief in 
support of his argument. (R. 531, 554-556, 1720). 
The "continuing treatment" doctrine has been adopted by some 
jurisdictions as a judicial doctrine to avoid the harsh result of 
a plaintiff's claim being barred before a plaintiff knows that 
there is a claim. The basis for the doctrine is to avoid those 
situations where discovery is delayed because of a continuing 
doctor/patient relationship. However, states which have adopted a 
discovery of injury statute of limitations for medical malpractice 
actions analogous to that adopted in Utah have rejected the 
continuous treatment doctrine as obsolete. The Washington Supreme 
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Court came to such a conclusion in Bixler v. Bowman, 614 P.2d 1290 
(Wash. 1980); 
Likewise, the 1971 statute substantially 
modified the continuing course of treatment 
rule formulated in Samuelson v. Freeman. 
Supra. Under Samuelson, the cause of action 
would not accrue until, when there was a 
continuous and substantially uninterrupted 
course of treatment for a particular illness, 
the treatment for the particular illness or 
condition had been terminated. The 1971 
statute restricts the commencement of the 
action to within "three years from the date of 
the alleged wrongful act". The concept of the 
termination of a "continuing course of 
treatment" has been succeeded by the 
designation of a "date of the alleged wrongful 
act". 
Id. at 1292. 
An opinion from the Kansas Supreme Court supports the same 
conclusion. In discussing the "continuous treatment" doctrine and 
the "physician-patient relationship" doctrine, the Kansas Supreme 
Court stated the following: 
An examination of the cases in which either of 
the two doctrines was adopted reveals that 
generally the treatment was a judicial effort 
to soften the harshness of the statutory 
accrual rule existing in the particular 
jurisdiction at the time. The Kansas 
Legislature did not see fit to mention either 
"physician-patient relationship" or 
"continuous treatment" as an element in 
measuring the time in which a cause of action 
accrues. We are not inclined to do so by 
judicially legislating. 
Hecht v. First National Bank & Trust Company, 490 P.2d 649, 656, 
657 (Kansas 1971). 
Although plaintiff relies on the case of Hundley v. St. 
Francis Hospital, 327 P.2d 131 (Cal. App. 1958) in support of his 
argument, this case addresses the physician/patient relationship 
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doctrine. This doctrine is a minority position which holds that 
the statute of limitations is tolled while the physician/patient 
relationship continues. Further, this doctrine was not argued by 
plaintiff before the trial court and is different from the 
continuing treatment doctrine. 
Defendants assert, and the trial court agreed, that the 
continuing treatment doctrine serves no purpose and is overruled in 
Utah by the legislatures passage of § 78-14-4. Section 78-14-4 
provides (1) a two year discovery of injury provision; (2) a four 
year statute of repose; (3) a foreign object exception; and (4) a 
fraudulent concealment exception. 
In fact, the fraudulent concealment exception is very similar 
to the continuing treatment doctrine. One of the purposes of the 
continuing treatment doctrine was to prevent the abuse of the 
physician/patient relationship by the physician to conceal a 
wrongful act. Thus, if the trial court had held that the 
continuing treatment doctrine was applicable in this instance, it 
would have put an additional exception into § 78-14-4 not provided 
for by the legislature. 
C. The trial court's decision that the continuing treatment 
doctrine was not applicable, even in the absence of § 78-14-4. was 
correct. 
Although the trial court found that the continuing treatment 
doctrine was not applicable in Utah since the passage of § 78-14-4, 
the court also held, as a matter of law, that the doctrine would 
not apply to this case even in the absence of § 78-14-4. This 
decision was based on the trial court's factual findings that 
plaintiff possessed all of the knowledge and information pertaining 
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to his alleged injury and possible causes during the time he was 
being treated by defendants which he possessed at the time he 
commenced this action and he was not misled or prevented from 
obtaining any information as a result of any continuing treatment, 
(R. at 1088) . Plaintiff argues that this conclusion of law was in 
error. 
Even if the continuing treatment doctrine were recognized in 
Utah, it would not apply to the facts of this case. To begin with, 
there was abundant evidence establishing that plaintiff had 
sufficient knowledge of his injury to commence the running of the 
statute of limitations as early as May 1984. The doctrine was not 
developed to toll the statute of limitations when a plaintiff knows 
he has a cause of action. Further, as discussed above, there is no 
evidence that plaintiff was misled or prevented from discovering 
information about his alleged injuries as a result of any 
continuous course of medical treatment. 
One of the primary purposes for the continuing treatment 
doctrine is for a situation where no single incident in a 
continuous chain of negligence can be identified as the cause of 
the harm. In such a situation, the doctrine is applied to prevent 
injustice. The continuing treatment doctrine would not serve such 
a purpose in this instance. As plaintiff himself admits, the 
claims in this case clearly result from one specific incident, the 
second surgery on February 27, 1984. Plaintiff's attempt to invoke 
the doctrine in this instance was simply an effort to avoid 
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his known failure to comply with the statute of limitations. The 
trial court's decision that the doctrine did not apply to the facts 
in this instance was correct. 
POINT IV 
PLAINTIFF'S APPEAL IS FRIVOLOUS. 
Rule 33 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure provides in 
part: 
If the court determines that a motion made or appeal 
taken under these rules is either frivolous or for delay, 
it shall award just damages, . . . 
Rule 33 further defines a frivolous appeal as "not grounded in 
fact, not warranted by existing law, or not based on a good faith 
argument to extend, modify, or reverse existing law." Plaintiff's 
brief in this instance meets the above definition of frivolous. 
This Court has held appeals to be frivolous in several recent 
decisions when faced with arguments similar to that presented by 
plaintiff in this instance. In O'Brien v. Rush, 744 P.2d 306 (Utah 
App. 1987), this Court held the defendant's appeal to be frivolous 
and stated the following: 
The record further shows the trial judge carefully 
fashioning relief after a fair opportunity for hearing. 
Defendant's claims on appeal simply controvert the 
findings of the court. The claims are not only without 
merit but are without basis in law or fact. Plaintiff is 
entitled to the benefit of Rule 33(a). 
Id. at 310. 
Further, in another situation similar to this instance, Eames 
v. Eames, 735 P.2d 395 (Utah App. 1987), this Court found the 
defendant's appeal to be frivolous and noted the following: 
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The record shows the trial judge making Findings of Fact, 
dividing the property, and awarding support after a 
careful consideration of all the evidence. Defendant 
ignores this. 
Id. at 397-398. 
This Court in Eames further emphasized the defendant's refusal to 
acknowledge and accept the uncontroverted evidence presented to the 
trial court as a factor in its decision to find defendant's appeal 
frivolous. 
As discussed at length above, plaintiff in this instance has 
completely ignored and refused to accept the uncontradicted 
evidence presented to the trial court. The record establishes that 
the trial court made its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
after a careful consideration of the evidence. Instead of 
addressing this evidence, plaintiff simply controverts the trial 
court's findings. In light of the clear and abundant evidence 
presented at trial, plaintiff's challenges to the trial court's 
Findings of Fact are without basis in fact and are frivolous. 
Additionally, plaintiff's challenge to the trial court's 
Conclusions of Law, specifically the trial court's interpretation 
of § 78-14-4, is not warranted by existing law and is not based on 
a good faith argument to extend, modify, or reverse existing law. 
Plaintiff essentially admits this in his brief when he notes that 
subsequent appellate court decisions have not followed and have 
misapplied Foil, the case he relies on to support his argument. 
(See Brief of Appellant, p. 19). The trial court's interpretation 
of § 78-14-4 was based on existing case precedent from Utah 
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Appellate Courts that have interpreted § 78-14-4. (R. at 1047-
1048). Thus, plaintiff's appeal is frivolous. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing arguments and authorities, the trial 
court's decision dismissing plaintiff's action because it was not 
commenced within the time required by the applicable statute of 
limitations, U.C.A § 78-14-4, should be affirmed. The trial 
court's Findings of Fact were supported by the evidence and it's 
Conclusions of Law were correct. Beginning in May 1984 and 
continuing thereafter, plaintiff knew and reasonably should have 
known that his second surgery in February 1984 was a possible cause 
of his perceived sexual dysfunction and that he might have a cause 
of action against defendants. Plaintiff's claim was not commenced 
until January 15, 1988. Thus, plaintiff's claim was time barred 
pursuant to U.C.A. § 78-14-4. 
DATED this ddTV day of f&fT^J6^ , 1992. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
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78-14-4 JUDICIAL CODE 340 
(31) "Tort" means any legal wrong, breach of 
duty, or negligent or unlawful act or omission 
proximately causing injury or damage to an-
other. 1992 
78-14-4. Statute of limitations — Exceptions — 
Application. 
(1) No malpractice action against a health care 
provider may be brought unless it is commenced 
within two years after the plaintiff or patient dis-
covers, or through the use of reasonable diligence 
should have discovered the injury, whichever first oc-
curs, but not to exceed four years after the date of the 
alleged act, omission, neglect or occurrence, except 
that: 
(a) In an action where the allegation against 
the health care provider is that a foreign object 
has been wrongfully left within a patient's body, 
the claim shall be barred unless commenced 
within one year after the plaintiff or patient dis-
covers, or through the use of reasonable diligence 
should have discovered, the existence of the for-
eign object wrongfully left in the patient's body, 
whichever first occurs; and 
(b) In an action where it is alleged that a pa-
tient has been prevented from discovering mis-
conduct on the part of a health care provider be-
cause that health care provider has affirmatively 
acted to fraudulently conceal the alleged miscon-
duct, the claim shall be barred unless commenced 
within one year after the plaintiff or patient dis-
covers, or through the use of reasonable dili-
gence, should have discovered the fraudulent 
concealment, whichever first occurs. 
(2) The provisions of this section shall apply to all 
persons, regardless of minority or other legal disabil-
ity under Section 78-12-36 or any other provision of 
the law, and shall apply retroactively to all persons, 
partnerships, associations and corporations and to all 
health care providers and to all malpractice actions 
against health care providers based upon alleged per-
sonal injuries which occurred prior to the effective 
date of this act; provided, however, that any action 
which under former law could have been commenced 
after the effective date of this act may be commenced 
only within the unelapsed portion of time allowed 
under former law; but any action which under former 
law could have been commenced more than four years 
after the effective date of this act may be commenced 
only within four years after the effective date of this 
act. 1979 
78-14-4.5. Amount of award reduced by 
amounts of collateral sources avail-
able to plaintiff — No reduction where 
subrogation right exists — Collateral 
sources defined — Procedure to pre-
serve subrogation rights — Evidence 
admissible — Exceptions. 
(1) In all malpractice actions against health care 
providers as defined in Section 78-14-3 in which dam-
ages are awarded to compensate the plaintiff for 
losses sustained, the court shall reduce the amount of 
such award by the total of all amounts paid to the 
plaintiff from all collateral sources which are avail-
able to him; however, there shall be no reduction for 
collateral sources for which a subrogation right exists 
as provided in this section nor shall there be a reduc-
tion for any collateral payment not included in the 
award of damages. Upon a finding of liability and an 
awarding of damages by the trier of fact, the court 
shall receive evidence concerning the total amounts 
of collateral sources which have been paid to or f 
the benefit of the plaintiff or are otherwise availau?r 
to him. The court shall also take testimony of
 a * 
amount which has been paid, contributed, or forfeitJi 
by, or on behalf of the plaintiff or members of h 
immediate family to secure his right to any collater 1 
source benefit which he is receiving as a result of K" 
injury, and shall offset any reduction in the award b 
such amounts. No evidence shall be received and no 
reduction made with respect to future collateral 
source benefits except as specified in Subsection (41 
(2) For purposes of this section "collateral source" 
means payments made to or for the benefit of the 
plaintiff for: 
(a) medical expenses and disability payments 
payable under the United States Social Security 
Act, any federal, state, or local income disability 
act, or any other public program, except the fed', 
eral programs which are required by law to seek 
subrogation; 
(b) any health, sickness, or income disability 
insurance, automobile accident insurance that 
provides health benefits or income disability cov-
erage, and any other similar insurance benefits, 
except life insurance benefits available to the 
plaintiff, whether purchased by the plaintiff or 
provided by others; 
(c) any contract or agreement of any person, 
group, organization, partnership, or corporation 
to provide, pay for, or reimburse the costs of hos-
pital, medical, dental, or other health care ser-
vices, except benefits received as gifts, contribu-
tions, or assistance made gratuitously; and 
(d) any contractual or voluntary wage continu-
ation plan provided by employers or any other 
system intended to provide wages during a period 
of disability. 
(3) To preserve subrogation rights for amounts 
paid or received prior to settlement or judgment, a 
provider of collateral sources shall serve at least 30 
days before settlement or trial of the action a written 
notice upon each health care provider against whom 
the malpractice action has been asserted. The written 
notice shall state the name and address of the pro-
vider of collateral sources, the amount of collateral 
sources paid, the names and addresses of all persons 
who received payment, and the items and purposes 
for which payment has been made. 
(4) Evidence is admissible of government programs 
that provide payments or benefits available in the 
future to or for the benefit of the plaintiff to the ex-
tent available irrespective of the recipient's ability to 
pay. Evidence of the likelihood or unlikelihood that 
such programs, payments, or benefits will be avail-
able in the future is also admissible. The trier of fact 
may consider such evidence in determining the 
amount of damages awarded to a plaintiff for future 
expenses. 
(5) No provider of collateral sources is entitled to 
recover the amounts of such benefits from a health 
care provider, the plaintiff, or any other person or 
entity as reimbursement for collateral source pay-
ments made prior to settlement or judgment, includ-
ing any payments made under Title 26, Chapter 19, 
except to the extent that subrogation rights to 
amounts paid prior to settlement or judgment are 
preserved as provided in this section. All policies of 
insurance providing benefits affected by this section 
are construed in accordance with this section. 1992 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN » ND FOR SAI .T I ft KE COT 1ETY ST.?' TE 01 I JTAH ""' 
G. KEVIN JONES, : COURT7- DECISION 
PL a i i,+ i f f , ' .: ' ('f , [ M I C - B 8 - 2 7 J 6 
vs . : 
THE STATE OF UTAH; THE : 
UNIVERSITY OF UTAH; THE 
UNIVERSITY OF UTAH HOSPITAL : 
AND MEDICAL CENTER; and 
JAMES M, BECKER, M.D., : 
Defendants. : 
The above-entitled matter came before the Tourt foi 
bifurcated trial commenr: \ TVI IMI •: ••'».- e: 
of whether the statute ol 1 imitations A3u : ,;i 
plaintiff's cause of action against the defendants. 
The Court hav :.s*cj£.i* -; : . . - -., .s 
adduced, the evidence received, arguments course: v :^ 'he 
applicable law has reached this decision. 
The Coil] : t _ ;*.-• ;ited thai he 
plaintiff, Kevin Jones, knev er rhoi.id lu:ve known that h«-. i.: 
sustained an injury and the causation of the same, on oi aouut 
May 
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Exhibit P-4, a letter dated May 29, 1984, from Dr. Becker 
to Dr. Middleton clearly indicates that Mr. Jones had discussed 
his sexual dysfunction with Dr. Becker prior to the date of the 
letter. Further, this letter indicates defendant had been 
"told by his family doctor that he might be impotent, secondary 
to his surgery." (line 24 of Exhibit 4). 
There is other evidence that supports the finding that 
plaintiff discovered "the injury" and made the causal 
connection between the problem and the surgery in April or May 
of 1984. The Court finds there has been no showing of any 
fraudulent concealment of plaintiff's injury by defendants or 
anyone else. 
Therefore, plaintiff had two years from May of 1984, the 
point of discovery, in which to file an Intent to Commence 
Legal Action. 
The Court finds the evidence is uncontroverted that the 
plaintiff's Notice of Intent to Commence Action was not filed 
until December of 1987. 
It is clear from a reading of Deschamps v. Pulley, 784 P.2d 
471 (Utah App. 1989) , that a medical malpractice claim must be 
filed within the statute of limitations period and that the 
fact that a plaintiff's physicians do not render an expert 
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opinion supportive ~* r •" oracticr v : i i 1 fact ma^ have 
discouraged su - ..'a^ <i -...c rt . aintif f' s f ai] ure to 
file a timely claim. T!;e Court .:; Deschamps v. Pulley, 
concludes that knowledge oi a j.e«:i" .r/ur • does not re qui re an 
expert opinion confirming malpractice . *r<=t»>ute would be 
tolled in every case until plaintifr. round favorable 
expert medical testimony. '• . 
The Court finds th^4* discoverv occurs vher ^ ~ ! n i r t 4 " 
knows or should have known he might have a cause .: a-::icr. 
There 1 * ty f *r: - . - • 
"discovery" does not occur until a plaintiff is absolutely sure 
of the cause of his injury. For example, :i n tl le instant case 
there s t i ] 1 a p p e a i: s t o t e a i e a ] f a c 1: qi i e s t i o n a b o i 11 11: I e i i. a 1 \ I r e 
and existence of any sexual dysfunction and the cause. 
The Court finds the testimony of Dr, Becker concerning -ie 
plaint i f f' s c o i I d i t :I o i i : e c r e d i b 1 e , D r , Becker stated, ". r. 
Jones has ill defined sexual dysfunction. the cause is hard 
to pinpoint. Objective evaluation has been equivocal in terms 
of . :. .. i  /I ia t :i 1: :i s a.i id i f :ii t exists, " . n.:.,: evaluation 
appears still be accurate, based ui.cn the totality of 
testimony adduced,, The court fj nds Dr. - ^ r r ~: : - .:•-,] ff 
of the risk of surgery, includii ig : ae I . S K if sexual 
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dysfunction, and that the plaintiff knew of this possibility 
before surgery; and that he related the sexual dysfunction he 
experienced to the surgical process, shortly after undergoing 
the second surgery. The Court finds plaintiff's articulated 
desire to have his sperm banked would not have been made but 
for knowledge of the risk of sexual dysfunction. 
The Court has considered plaintiff's demeanor and 
testimony, and finds that the plaintiff's demeanor, attitude 
and the content of his answers, reveals him to be an 
intelligent, careful man. Plaintiff's answers in court 
reflected a great attention to detail. The Court so finds and 
further notes plaintiff is a lawyer, who understands the 
concept of informed consent. The Court finds the plaintiff had 
access to the Mayo Clinic pamphlet and read the same. The 
Court finds that the plaintiff clearly testified that in 1984, 
he knew of changes in his sexual function or "system", i.e., no 
ejaculent and diminished erections (Ex. D-4). 
Plaintiff's specific testimony at trial was that he 
masturbated to "test" his sexual function after the first 
surgery, and again after the second surgery, and that he 
noticed and reported sexual problems in April or May of 1984. 
Plaintiff testified that after the "testing", following his 
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first K i ^ -' * -- -, f'at 3 eas t 
through that one okay". The plaintiff's reference to :^:. 
oneff was clearly a reference surgery. PI a int i f f a ] so 
t e s t i f i e d t h a t 1 i e in a s 11 i r b a t e d -: ; • e c o i 1 d 3 u 1 g e r y 
and discovered what he perceived to be sexual dysfunction. The 
plaintiff and his parents, Veda and Garth Jones, testified that 
h e :i i s c 1 o s e d 11 1 € s e x u a ] d y s f u n c 11 o :i 1 t c • t: h • 2 n: t i 1 1 I I a y o f 19 8 4 a 1 1 d 
the surgery was discussed as a cause at that time. Garth Jones 
testified that he called Dr. Becker and asked questions 
regarding 11: 1 < 2 "consequences : f thi s operation" -in relation to 
the sexual dysfunction The evidence supports th-r i i 1 ] ate 
April or May of 1984, the plaintiff told Dr. Becker he was 
experiencing no ejaculation. The testimony reflects that Dr. 
Becker discussed possible causes at that time ai id made 
referrals to D::i Mi d'i"- " : * *v - • i t :) f 1 13 ther exp 1 : • r e 
any sexual dysfunction. - : ;.. physicians to wlloin 
plaintiff was referred, were advised of the dysfunction problem 
and p 1 a i n t i f f' 3 c o n c e r n a 1: 1 :> 1 11 :i t 1: 1 = :i 1 , g ] i n 1 : e d t :« 11 1 e c :) 1 • : 1 
surgery. 
Ii 1 Exhibit D-17, the depositior -f r Becker, rr. Becker 
stated (a t 5: >. 9 8) , 11: 1 a t 1 , € \ t < : - .1 d \ - • • 1 j n g !:  :> 
plaintiff's complaint of sexual dysfunction !l : :? unlikely to 
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be the result of surgery." However, Dr. Becker goes on to say 
that surgery as a cause was discussed and "surgery was never 
ruled out" as a possible cause of the plaintiff's problems. It 
appears that plaintiff was on notice at this time of the 
problem and the potential causes, including the surgery. 
The Court finds that while the plaintiff testified he 
didn't relate his sexual dysfunction to nerve injury from 
surgery until September, 1987, that is belied by the other 
evidence and by the totality of his own testimony. Further, 
the Court finds that the plaintiff's contention that he didn't 
think sexual dysfunction was a real risk, and wasn't advised of 
the same, is not credible in view of the totality of the 
testimony, including plaintiff's testimony that he considered 
and requested his sperm be banked. 
The Court finds that when the plaintiff got Dr. Dayton's 
opinion in September 1987, this only confirmed the plaintiff's 
own conclusion formed in 1984 as to the problem and its cause. 
The Court finds that the plaintiff found other theories on 
causation unacceptable. For example, plaintiff found Dr. 
Hammond's explanation, of a possible psychological cause for 
the dysfunction, incredible and "unsatisfactory" and never 
believed this to be the cause. The plaintiff's actions, 
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including his **:.*: re i *' pursue psychological treatment, make 
j t c] ear . * • . . ...:-." we r e 
psychological. Exhibit D-, : establishes tna:. -ir\r 2 985, 
Dr. Franklin I.. Smith, r; ^ v vlogist, was asked by the plaintiff 
if surgery 1 la :i caused 1 :i . -i em. •. " '- • -:' 
The fact that Dr. Becker did not acknowledge in 1984 or :i ,ow 
that plaintiff has permanent sexual dysfunction problem 
caused 1: y sur gei y, is immaterial to the issue <^ ; plaintif '? 
knowledge. Dr. Frankli: I,». Smith's testimony referred 
plaintiff's request for information regarding the next is between 
surgery ana sexual dysfunction (See Exhibit P-14) ai id tl .is 
Doctor ndicated the plaintiff reported sexual problems 
starting "after the \ seconc:i operati oi i :ii i ,. Fe 1: • ri iai :\, ' c: • f 1 98 i'" . 
Finally, Terry Stoker's testimony supports the 19 84 
discovery by plaintiff. 
M s . s t o k e r test i f i e c:i 1 • *»1 a :i n t j f f :i i i < :I :i c a t e d 1 i e 
"contemplated suing" repeatedly ;•;.» ;^learly states threats of 
a lawsuit were made as early as 1985. 
The . • eatmen t • i l : : - • : 
inconsistent with the statute of limitations passed by the V: *h 
legislature. 
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Based upon the foregoing, the Court orders that counsel for 
the defendants, Mr. Williams, is to prepare more detailed 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and an Order 
consistent with this Decision, and submit them as required 
under the Third District Court Rules of Practice. 
Dated this 18th day of December, ljJSl. /I 
Ci ' ^lj{^/~2rz^ 
LESLIE A. LEWIS 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
nereby c e r t i f y t h a t I m a :i 3 e d a 11: t i c a n ci c o r r e c: t c o p y 
of the foregoing Court's Decision, tn :> the following, 
this / / day of December, 1991: 
Robert F. Orton 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
68 S. Main, Fifth Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
William T. Evans 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorney for Defendant Statie of ( J t .al i 
3 6 S. State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
David G. Williams 
Attorney for Defendants University of 
Utah, University Hospital and 
James M. Becker, M.D. 
10 Exchange Place, 11th Floor 
P.O. Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
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DAVID G. WILLIAMS (A3481) 
TERENCE L. ROONEY (A5789) _ 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTI1 \Il-'i
 t.^.V 
Attorneys for Defendants In -.: -:v?c:M .. • r^ 
The University of Utah, The University 
of Utah Hospital and Medical Center, |, \\\ 2 3 1992 
and James M. Becker, M.D. 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor /) ^ 
Post Office Box 45000 #—•, 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone: (801) 521 -9 000 
IN THE THIRD II IJDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
G. KEVIN JONES, 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
Plaintiff, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
vs, 
THE STATE OF UTAH; THE Civil No. C88-2736 
UNIVERSITY OF UTAH; THE 
UNIVERSITY OF UTAH HOSPITAL 
AND MEDICAL CENTER; and JAMES 
M BECKER, M n 
Defendants. 
This matter was tried to the "-r-rt withou" - -'-iry :* 
November 12, 13 and 25, 1991. In accordance with . '?-:?-«• "r*~; 
(1 9 53 as amended) the tr :ii s J was ] urn, t ed I o i he . - . JS pen ta::i i i:i ng 
to defendants1 statute of limitations defense. Plaintiff was 
present at trial and represented by ln,<; counsel nf record. 
Defendants wer e i epresented at tr :i <i I I i v I hv i i : ouni. el n!; record. 
Plaintiff and defendants adduced evidence through witnesses and 
exhibits and each rested. The Court having heard closi n g ai gi lments 
fr<:>iri c o u n s e ] efendants and having reviewed the 
trial briefs submitted by plaintiff and defendants hereby enters 
the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. In 1981 plaintiff was diagnosed as having chronic 
ulcerative colitis. He was treated for that condition with 
-Azulfddine and- Prednisone by Dr. Clifford Harman, a 
gastroenterologist, through December 1983. 
2. In November 1982 plaintiff consulted with Dr. James 
Becker at the University of Utah School of Medicine concerning 
surgical options for treatment of his ulcerative colitis, including 
specifically the ileoanal anastomosis procedure. Between November 
1982 and December 1983 plaintiff's parents also visited with Dr. 
Becker regarding surgical options for treatment of plaintiff's 
disease. 
3. In October 1983 plaintiff visited the Mayo Clinic in 
Rochester, Minnesota where Dr. Huizenga, a gastroenterologist, 
confirmed the diagnosis of chronic ulcerative colitis and entered 
plaintiff into a study protocol for an investigational drug (5ASA) 
for the treatment of ulcerative colitis. 
4. Plaintiff did not respond favorably to the 5ASA treatment 
and in December 1983 his ulcerative colitis became so severe that 
he was admitted to Holy Cross Hospital. In the opinion of his 
treating gastroenterologist, Dr. Harman, medical therapies had been 
exhausted and surgery was necessary to save plaintiff's life. 
5. In January 1984 plaintiff and his parents discussed the 
surgical options with Dr. Becker. Plaintiff elected to undergo the 
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ileoanal anastomosis procedure after having been fully informed 
concerning the risks and benefits of that procedure and of the 
alternative procedures. 
6. Dr. Becker advised plaintiff that the risk of sexual 
dysfunction was lower with the ileoanal anastomosis procedure than 
with the alternative procedures, but that sexual dysfunction was 
a risk of the procedure. 
7. In January 1984 Dr. Becker explained to plaintiff that 
the ileoanal anastomosis procedure would be performed in three 
separate operations. 
8. On January 5, 1984, the first phase of the ileoanal 
anastomosis, removal of most of the colon and the creation of a 
temporary ileostomy, was performed by Dr. Becker on plaintiff. 
9. The first phase of the procedure was completed without 
complications. Following completion of the first phase and prior 
to the second phase of the procedure, plaintiff masturbated to test 
his sexual function. At that time he felt relieved and stated "at 
least I got through that one okay", referring to the first surgery. 
10. On February 27, 1984, plaintiff underwent the second 
phase of the ileoanal anastomosis procedure, the mucosal 
proctectomy or removal of the mucosal lining from the rectum. 
Again, prior to this procedure the risks were explained to 
plaintiff by Dr. Becker, including the risk of sexual dysfunction. 
11. In April or May 1984 plaintiff discovered what he 
perceived to be sexual dysfunction, including lack of ejaculation 
and diminished frequency and quality of erections. 
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12. In May 1984 plaintiff reported his perceived sexual 
dysfunction to his parents and to Dr. Becker. At that time he 
reported to Dr. Becker that he had been told by his family doctor 
that he might be impotent, secondary to his surgery. 
13. In May 1984 Dr. Becker referred plaintiff to Dr. 
Middleton, a urologist, and to Dr. Hammond, a psychologist and sex 
therapist, to explore the reported sexual dysfunction. 
14. Since May 1984, in discussions and correspondence with 
various physicians, plaintiff has repeatedly causally related his 
perceived sexual dysfunction to the second operative procedure 
performed in February 1984. 
15. Since April or May 1984, plaintiff has had an ill defined 
sexual dysfunction, the cause of which has not been definitively 
determined. pfe^c±J.ve_eval^ 
clTarAf^injg^h^ 
16. Beginning in May 1984 and continuing thereafter, 
plaintiff knew and reasonably should have known that the second 
surgery performed in February 1984 was a possible cause of his 
perceived sexual dysfunction and that he might have a cause of 
action against defendants. 
17. Plaintiff did not accept or rely upon any other theories 
of causation suggested by defendants or any other physicians. 
Specifically, plaintiff rejected and did not rely upon any 
suggestion that there may be a psychological cause of his perceived 
sexual dysfunction. 
18* Plaintiff was never misled or deceived in any manner 
concerning the possible causes of his perceived sexual dysfunction. 
19. Defendants did not fraudulently represent or conceal any 
information relevant to plaintiff's treatment, recovery or 
perceived sexual dysfunction. 
2Q-.—Br-.—Mera-4-1—Dayton—"did—not provide pT¥iirti-ff-
sLnfoxmati-on—i-n—September—±9&?—eoncerniTrg -""possible causes of 
^^ j3iatif-£JH5--i>e was nor 
previous ly—aware*: 
2$. During the years 1984 and 1985 plaintiff considered suing 
defendants for medical malpractice based on his perceived sexual 
dysfunction and general dissatisfaction with the outcome of his 
surgeries. 
2&. On June 28, 1984 the third and final phase of the 
ileoanal anastomosis procedure was performed and completed. 
2% All surgeries and treatment performed and rendered by 
defendants were provided at the University of Utah Medical Center. 
2%. Dr. Becker was at all times relevant hereto a full time 
employee and faculty member in the Department of Surgery at the 
University of Utah School of Medicine. 
2$-. Plaintiff's Notice of Intent to Commence Action was not 
served until December 4, 1987. 
2^. This action was commenced April 26, 1988. 
2jn Plaintiff's action was not commenced within two years 
after he knew and reasonably should have known of his perceived 
sexual dysfunction and general dissatisfaction with the outcome of 
00105G 
his surgeries and that he might have a claim for malpractice 
against defendants. 
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court now makes 
the following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The applicable statute of limitations in this case is § 
78-14-4, UCA (1953 as amended), 
2. Plaintiff's action was not commenced within the time 
required by § 78-14-4 and his action is therefore barred. 
3* The two year limitation period provided in § 78-14-4 
commences when the plaintiff discovers or through the use of 
reasonable diligence should have discovered that he or she has an 
injury and that he or she might have a cause of action based on the 
injury. Commencement of the limitation period is not delayed until 
a plaintiff is advised by an "expert" that a valid claim exists or 
otherwise knows with certainty the cause of the injury or that the 
defendants were negligent. 
4. An action is commenced for purposes of the statute of 
limitations when the complaint is filed, but in this case the 
action was not timely whether the commencement of action is deemed 
to be December 4, 1987 when the Notice of Intent was served, or 
April 26, 1988 when the Complaint was filed. 
5. In addition to the relevant findings of fact, the Court 
concludes as a matter of law, that defendants did not fraudulently 
conceal any alleged misconduct and that plaintiff was not prevented 
-6-
001087 
from discovering any misconduct on the part of defendants by any 
fraudulent concealment. 
6. The "continuing treatment doctrine" is not applicable 
since the legislature passed § 78-14-4, UCA (1953 as amended). 
7. The continuing treatment doctrine would not apply to this 
case, even in the absence of § 78-14-4, because of the Court's 
factual findings that plaintiff possessed all of the knowledge and 
information pertaining to his alleged injury and possible causes 
during the time he was being treated by defendants which he 
possessed at the time he commenced this action and he was not 
misled or prevented from obtaining any information as a result of 
the continuing treatment. 
8. Because plaintiff's action was not commenced within the 
time required by § 78-14-4, the applicable statute of limitations, 
it is not necessary for the Court to rule on defendants1 defense 
that the action was not commenced within the shorter period of time 
required by S 63-30-12, UCA (1953 as amended). 
DATED this U^ d^ay of January, 1992. 
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AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE 
: ss. 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
PATRICIA C. WHITE, being duly sworn, says that she is employed 
by the law offices of Snow, christensen & Martineau, attorneys for 
defendants The University of Utah, The university of Utah Hospital 
and Medical Center and James M. Becker, M.D. herein; that she 
served the attached FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW (Number 
C88-2736, Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County) upon 
the parties listed below by placing a true and correct copy thereof 
in an envelope addressed to: 
Robert F. Orton 
MARSDEN, ORTON, CAHOON & GOTTFREDSON 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
68 South Main Street, Fifth Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
and causing the same to be mailed first class, postage prepaid, on 
the ^ day of January, 1992 
Paftricia C. White / 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this Q day of January, 
1992 
NOTARY PUBL, 
Residing i he State of Utah 
My commission Expires NOTARY PUBLIC 
September! 
STATE OF UTAH 
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